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The National Paralegal Institute is preparing a guide for
Legal Services projects on unauthorized practice of law and
ethics opinions relating to the use of paralegals in Legal
Services settings. The Institute needs information (preferably
copies of pleadings) about any complaints relating to the use
of paralegals. We are most interested in complaints dealing
with unauthorized practice lodged with courts, bar associations, or administrative agencies. Also send information
about any charges brought against any attorney relating to the
attorney's use of paralegals.
The American Bar Foundation published a general
UnauthorizedPracticeHandbook in 1972. It is a compilation
of all state statutes dealing with the practice of law as well as
synopses of cases and comments on unauthorized practice.
Anyone interested in obtaining a xerox copy of this out-ofprint publication can order it from: Xerox University Microfilms, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106,
order number OP2002790. A check or money order for $20
plus the purchaser's state sales tax on $20 should be included
with the order.

NATIONAL JUVENILE LAW CENTER
3642 Lindell Blvd., St. Louis, Mo. 63108, (314) 533-8868
Expungement of Arrest Records
Contrary to the philosophy of the juvenile court, it is
undoubtedly a rare occasion when a child benefits from his
exposure to the juvenile court system. Even when a child is
actually rehabilitated by the process, the invidious effects that
flow from being labeled a "juvenile delinquent" may serve to
negate any benefit that he may have received. Perhaps the
most unjustifiable of all side effects is the stigma that attaches
to a child who has been arrested and subsequently either
released without prosecution or acquitted. In a society that
espouses the idea that an individual is innocent until proven
guilty, he will be treated as though his arrest were synonymous
with guilt. On applications for future employment and for
admission into educational institutions, he may be asked for
information about past arrests without regard to the
disposition of those arrests. Clearly this information could
only be viewed in an unfavorable light.
In order to limit the harmful effects of an arrest record,
many jurisdictions require that juvenile arrest records be kept
separate from those of adult offenders. (See e.g., Section 55 of
the Uniform Juvenile Court Act, drafted by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1968,
which provides in part that "[Ijaw enforcement records and
files concerning a child shall be kept separate from the
records and files of arrests of adults.") In addition, many
jurisdictions have also placed limitations on who may inspect
arrest records. (See e.g., Section 55 of the Uniform Juvenile
Court Act, supra, which limits access to these records by the
public unless: (1) the child is transferred to criminal court for
prosecution; (2) the interest of national security so requires,
or; (3) the court orders it for the best interest of the child.)
While these provisions theoretically provide considerable protection for a child, the expungement or sealing of his
arrest record is the best method of protecting him from the
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harmful effects that normally result from it. Section 57 of the
Uniform Juvenile Court Act also empowers the juvenile court
to seal law enforcement records. Unfortunately, even these
provisions are no panacea since most state statutes permit the
expungement or sealing of records only after certain
conditions have been met. These conditions may be so strict as
to require a waiting period free of further offenses and a
showing that the child has been rehabilitated.
The limitations of such provisions are obvious. If a child
must wait for two years to expunge the record of his arrest in a
case where he was never brought to trial, he must suffer the
consequences of that arrest for the entire period. During that
time he must answer "yes" to any inquiry as to whether he has
ever been arrested. Should he be involved in any further
trouble, that arrest may be considered by the judge at
disposition, and that contact with the police may be the
reasons for closer surveillance of all his activities by law
enforcement authorities as well as serving as the basis for his
consideration as a suspect whenever a crime is committed. In
order to avoid these handicaps, counsel for the juvenile should
petition the court for immediate expungement of arrest
records where charges are either dismissed without prosecution or where the child is acquitted at his adjudicatory
hearing.
Counsel's challenge to the retention of these records
may be based upon a violation of the child's right to privacy.
In the last century this concept has become an established
principle of American civil jurisprudence recognized as basic
to the Bill of Rights. (In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) the intimacies of the marriage relationship were
held to be protected by this right. In Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1969) the right to possession of obscene materials in
one's own home was established. Eisnstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972) extended the Griswold rule to unmarried
individuals, and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) the
Supreme Court found the right of a woman to terminate an
unwanted pregnancy covered by her right to privacy.) Based
on this right, several courts have decided that a court should
order the expungement of an arrest record when the harm to
the individual's right of privacy, because of adverse unwarranted consequences, outweighs the public interest in
retaining these records. In U.S. v. Kalish, 271 F.Supp. 968
(D.P.R. 1967), the court recognized that:
[N]o public good is accomplished by retention of
criminal identification records. On the other
hand, a great imposition is placed upon the
citizen. His privacy and personal dignity is
invaded as long as the Justice Department retains
'criminal' identification records, 'criminal'
arrest
records, fingerprints and a rogue's gallery photographs. . . .The preservation of these records
constitutes an unwarranted attack upon his
character and reputation and violates his right of
privacy; it violates his dignity as a human being.
(271 F. Supp. at 970.)
The Supreme Court of Colorado recognized that
retention of arrest records might constitute an invasion of a
person's right to privacy in Davidson v. Dill, 503 P.2d 157
(Colo. 1972). The court further outlined factors to be
considered by trial courts to determine whether an invasion
would be likely in future cases. Those factors include: (1) who
has access to the records; (2) to what extent the information
can be disseminated; (3) what justification exists for their
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retention and; (4) exactly what information is contained in the
records. (See also Eddy v. Moore, 487 P.2d 211 (Wash. App.
1971) and Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F.Supp. 718 (D. D.C.
1971).)
While the trend of these recent adult cases supports the
expungement of arrest records where an arrest has not led to a
conviction, juvenile decisions show no such clear pattern.
Instead, the "benevolent" philosophy of the juvenile court is
being used as the basis for decisions to maintain these files.
Recently, in Washington, four juveniles sought expungement
of both their court and arrest records. A unanimous court
decided that the philosophy of the juvenile court required the
maintenance of court records in order to assist the court in
formulating plans for best aiding and correcting juveniles
brought before it. (Monroe v. Tielsch, 525 P.2d 250 (Wash.
1970).) The majority of the court concluded that law enforcement agencies have a legitimate interest in the maintenance of
juvenile arrest records in order that they can monitor any
developing patterns of behavior of the juvenile.
A strong dissent challenged the majority opinion.
Although concurring that the court should be in possession of
any and all pertinent information, the minority disagreed that
law enforcement agencies should maintain files of arrests that
did not lead to convictions. It reviewed the disabilities that
could flow from an arrest record and noted that arrest, in and
of itself, is probative of nothing, stating that:
[T]here seems to be something drastically wrong
with a societal attitude which imposes or precipitates social and economic sanctions upon an
individual as the cost of social penitence and
forgiveness when the subject is innocent of any
conclusively ascertained and established social
misconduct. (525 P.2d at 256.)
The dissent further articulated the argument for expungement of an arrest record because it violated a child's
fundamental right to privacy.
The paucity of case law concerning the expungement
and sealing of the arrest records of juveniles makes it a
difficult issue for counsel to prepare. On the other hand, the
importance of the issue and lack of readily ascertainable
standards makes it one which is ripe for review. Therefore, it
is urged that Legal Services attorneys confront the problem
and, additionally, be selective in their choice of forum and
presentation in order to minimize the expansion of existing
bad case law.
The National Juvenile Law Center is currently preparing
materials on juvenile records that may be helpful to the
attorney dealing with a problem of this nature.
Adrienne Volenik, Staff Attorney

NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, INC.
One Court St., Boston, Mass. 02108, (617) 523-8010

Issues in Public Utilities Cases
What follows is a short checklist of issues of concern to
poor people which may be raised in public utilities cases
before state regulatory commissions. The checklist is limited
to telephone cases, but similar issues can be raised in gas,

electric, water, sewer, bus, subway, rail, taxicab and community antenna television cases. The checklist is further
limited to issues which usually do not require a great deal of
time. Often a lawyer need appear only for the presentation of
his client's or experts' testimony and for crucial crossexamination of opposing witnesses. During the balance of the
hearings, a student, either paid or volunteer, can follow the
proceedings. Students (or professors) who would be interested
can be found in law, business administration, economics,
engineering and accounting. Depending on the laws of the
individual state, the student may be a legal representative.
Before starting on a public utility case, a Legal Services
lawyer obviously must have an interested client. Very often the
client may have a specific complaint (e.g., termination of
telephone service), but if you inquire in depth, you will find
that they just cannot afford the service, but may still have a
great need for it (e.g., the client has a heart condition and
must be able to call the doctor). Or the client may have heard
about a proposed rate increase and may say: "I can't afford
the bill now." You have three choices: to try to make a deal
which the client may not be able to honor in the future; to
have the client use a pay telephone (the rate for which may be
going from $. 10 to $.20); or to try to get fair rates for all your
clients. If you have enough clients, or a community group
which wants to get involved, you may be able to intervene.
Depending on the laws in your state, intervention may
mean filing a written petition or merely appearing at a hearing. In any case, you should ask for the right to raise your
issues, the right to present testimony, and the right to crossexamine adverse witnesses. In addition, if you intend a court
appeal, you may have to show that your clients are "aggrieved." (Generally, a rate payer has been held to be aggrieved by a rate increase.)
In telephone rate cases, as in most other regulatory rate
setting matters, you will find that the commission is most
concerned with the "rate base" and the "rate of return."
Generally, the rate base is the property "used or usable in
providing service." It is expressed in the dollar value of this
property. The rate of return is the percentage return which the
company is allowed on the rate base. This is not the same
thing as a return on equity ("profit"), nor is the company
guaranteed this amount. Generally the regulatory commission
finds that the company has A dollars of rate base and allows B
percentage rate of return on this rate base. For further
elucidation on these concepts see Mello, Public Utility Rate
Increases, A PracticeManualforAdministrativeLitigation, 8
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 411 (October 1974).
In telephone cases, there are the additional terms of
"cost of service" and "value of service." Although regulatory
commissions differ on which of these concepts is most important in setting rates, historically telephone rates were set on
the value of service to the customer. The idea was that when
telephone service was expanded, it was unfair to charge different customers different amounts based only on where they
were located geographically. Rather, customers were charged
what the service was worth to them. More recently cost of
service has become more important, and the differential
rates between customers are now more commonly based on
the cost of serving that customer. This will be noted in the
issues checklist.
The final, fundamental concepts in telephone cases are
"basic services," "supplemental services" and "optional
services."
CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW

